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This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in 
determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor’s (2007) and Heck’s 
(2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in 
establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the 
prima facie state / content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of 
‘state/content error error’, i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that characterize 
the type of content certain representations have are indeed independent of their structural 
properties. I also consider another objection to the general strategy, namely that it falls short 
of showing that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experiences thus established is the 
kind of content that figures in true explanations of intentional behavior. I concede this point 
in respect of Fodor’s version of the strategy, while denying that it has any bearing on Heck’s 
approach. The success of this objection in Heck’s case ultimately depends, I argue, upon an 





Neo-Fregean philosophers follow Evans in defending the idea that genuine instances 
of thinking are necessarily subject to the principle of compositionality that he dubbed ‘the 
Generality Constraint’ (GC henceforth) (see e.g., Davies, 1992; McDowell, 1994; Peacocke, 
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1992, 2001). According to (a version of) GC (Evans, 1982, p.104): “if a subject can be 
credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources for 
entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which he has a 
conception.” A subject can thus be credited with the thought that Mary is tall, only if she can 
also think of Mary as having some other property such as e.g. being intelligent —a property 
for which the subject has a concept. In a slightly different version of GC, Evans argues that a 
subject can be credited with the thought that a particular object has a property, only if the 
subject can also think of other objects as having this very same property. The attribution to a 
subject of a contentful state of the form a is F thus commits us to the idea that that subject 
should also be able to represent a as G and b as F (Evans, 1982, p. 104, ft. 21). 
 
Cognitive atomists, like Fodor, being perhaps more empirically minded, deny that 
GC is necessarily true. They think that it is just highly unlikely, although perhaps not 
impossible, that there may be creatures who could think that Mary is intelligent and John is 
tall, but not that Mary is tall and John is intelligent (Fodor, 1987, pp. 148-153; Fodor and 
Pylyshyn, 1988). They view GC as a contingent truth about thought. For Fodor, all actual 
instances of thinking have a language-like structure. Fodor appeals to the compositional 
structure of conceptual representations in an inference to the best explanation of the 
undeniable systematicity and productivity of thought and language. Hence his commitment 
to a language of thought hypothesis.  
 
Both neo-Fregeans and Concept Atomists, despite their different approach to GC and 
to concepts, thus agree that the content of the representations involved in genuine instances 
of thinking is conceptual because such representations have the kind of compositional 
structure that supports the generalizations GC makes explicit. It is against the background of 
this general picture of conceptual content that the —essentially contrastive— notion of 
nonconceptual content is usually presented.  
 
The notion of nonconceptual content becomes central, not only, but noticeably, in 
debating the nature of the content of the representations involved in personal-level perceptual 
experience. Here neo-Fregeans split into two irreconcilable camps: conceptualist and 
 
 
nonconceptualist. Perceptual conceptualists (e.g. McDowell, 1994; Brewer, 1999, 2005) 
defend the view that the way a subject represents the world in experience can be fully 
specified by using concepts she possesses. Nonconceptualists (e.g. Peacocke, 1992; Heck, 
2000) maintain that there are ways of representing the world that do not reflect the concepts 
a creature possesses. Although, for the conceptualist, the content of perceptual experiences is 
conceptual and hence perception, like thought, is subject to GC, the constraint has not 
played, so far, a significant role in the dialectics of this traditional version of the debate, i.e., 
the tradition that begins with Evans and that has McDowell and Peacocke as main 
representatives of the, respectively, conceptualist and nonconceptualist camps.i This may not 
seem surprising. On the one hand, the perceptual conceptualist’s motivation for claiming that 
the content of perceptual experiences is conceptual has never been to show that perception, 
like thought and language, is productive and systematic. On the other hand, the most 
important arguments on the nonconceptualist side of the debate have also revolved around 
issues other than GC’s failure to govern perception, issues such as the fine-grained character 
of perceptual experience, the putative continuity in the way creatures with different 
conceptual repertoires represent the world in their perceptual experiences, the need for a non-
circular account of perceptual concept possession and acquisition (Peacocke 1992, 2001), the 
correct explanation of sensorimotor behavior and know-how (Cussins, 1992) and the need to 
comprehend the mental life of pre-linguistic children and non-linguistic animals (Bermúdez, 
1998, 2003).ii  
 
These arguments have always been controversial, but they have recently been 
criticized using a new tactic. It has been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits 
of two different interpretations (see e.g. Crowther, 2006; Heck, 2000; Laurier, 2004; Speaks, 
2005; Tye, 2006). On the first one, nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content 
perceptual states, as opposed to e.g. beliefs, have.iii Being nonconceptual is here depicted as a 
property of the content of perceptual states. On the second interpretation, being 
nonconceptual is a property of perceptual states, not of their content. Perceptual 
nonconceptualism, on this latter view, is a thesis about a particular type of representational 
state, i.e., a particular type of representations. Being nonconceptual is thus the property that a 
mental state has if the subject that instantiates such a state need not possess the concepts 
 
 
involved in a correct characterization of its content. It has become standard to refer to these 
two interpretations of perceptual nonconceptualism as, respectively, the ‘content’ and the 
‘state’ view (Heck, 2000).iv Most proponents of this distinction have used it in an attempt to 
show that the many of the arguments in favor of perceptual nonconceptualism succeed only 
in establishing the truth of the state view, but leave the —stronger— content view 
unsupported. The new tactic against these arguments thus consists in complaining that they 
conflate questions about the properties of perceptual states with questions about the 
properties of their content. 
 
The contemporary partnership between neo-Fregean nonconceptualists (such as 
Heck, 2007) and Concept Atomists (such as Fodor, 2007) should strike a dissonant cord 
against the backdrop of the criticisms arising from this state / content distinction. Fodor and 
Heck join forces to argue that discursive representations have, while perceptual 
representations lack, a canonical decomposition. Instead, perceptual representations have an 
iconic structure and —they argue— the possession of such a different structure is so 
cognitively relevant that the content of perceptual representations should be considered 
content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. If successful, this dialectical move would not 
only provide an argument in favor of the —stronger— content view of perceptual 
nonconceptualism, but also, and importantly, it would actually undermine the very 
distinction between the state and content view, as it would show that questions about mental 
states’ structure can be relevant for solving issues about mental states’ content. The 
dialectical move is also interesting because it turns the issue of the existence of 
nonconceptual content into an empirical one. If nonconceptual content is the content of 
iconic representations, then, if experimental psychology provides good examples of iconic 
representations, as it seems it does, we would have not just an argument but actually 
evidence in favor of the existence of nonconceptual content —a challenge for those who 
argue against the intelligibility of such a notion on a priori grounds (e.g. McDowell, 1994). 
 
This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of perceptual states in 
determining the (nonconceptual) nature of their content. I take Fodor’s (2007) and Heck’s 
(2007) recent arguments as a starting point. I examine their plausibility in light of the 
 
 
distinction between state and content (non)conceptualism, since, at least prima facie, the 
structural properties that states of a given type have don’t tell us anything about their content, 
and thus Fodor’s and Heck’s dialectical move could be considered a clear case of state / 
content error. I argue that this worry is nothing but an instance of a ‘state / content error 
error’v —i.e., the error of considering that, once the approach to mental content is made from 
the perspective of psychological explanation, the properties that characterize the type of 
content certain states have are independent of their structural properties. The shift in strategy 
should be welcomed as a way of clarifying what is really at issue in the perceptual 
(non)conceptualism debate, but also, and more generally, for bringing to the fore the issue of 
how —on a certain understanding of mental content— the structural properties of the 
representations underlying certain cognitive states become crucial for explaining their 
psychological profile. In this vein, I also consider another objection to the general strategy, 
namely that it falls short of showing that the nonconceptual content of perceptual 
representations thus established is the kind of content that figures in true explanations of 
intentional behavior (see e.g. Poston, 2007). I concede the point in respect of Fodor’s version 
of the strategy, while denying that it has any bearing on Heck’s approach. 
 
 
2. Iconic vs. discursive modes of representation. 
 
It is widely held that entertaining the thought that e.g. Mary is intelligent requires 
representing Mary as an object that falls under the concept intelligent —as well as being able 
to represent other objects as also falling under the same concept and being able to represent 
the object Mary falling under some other concept. Discursive representations thus exhibit the 
type of compositional structure captured by GC and are considered paradigms of 
representations whose content is conceptual. The philosophical slogan that conceptual 
content is content subject to GC should be understood as a slightly inaccurate expression of 
this idea. Slightly inaccurate because it’s thinkers’ cognitive processes that are governed by 
GC and hence a more neutral way of approaching the kind of generalizations that GC makes 
explicit is to talk about the compositionality of mental representationsvi. A representation is 
then compositional if and only if its content and syntactic structure is determined by the 
 
 
content and the syntactic structure of its constituents. But, as Fodor (2007, p. 108) reminds 
us, “not every part of a discursive representation is ipso facto one of its constituents.” To use 
his example, take a sentence such as ‘John loves Mary’. The syntactic structure of this 
sentence is made explicit in (1). 
 
(1) (John)NP ((loves)V ((Mary)NP)VP)S 
 
‘John’, ‘Mary’, and ‘loves Mary’ are constituents of ‘John loves Mary’, but it would 
be a mistake to think that ‘John loves’ or ‘John … Mary’ also are. ‘John loves’ and ‘John … 
Mary’ are not parts that could figure in the canonical decomposition captured by (1) and 
since “[t]he constituents of a discursive representation are those of its parts that are 
recognized by its canonical decomposition” (Fodor, 2007, p. 108), ‘John loves’ and ‘John … 
Mary’ are not constituents of ‘John loves Mary’. They are not constituents of ‘John loves 
Mary’ because they do not have a semantic interpretation of their own that contributes to the 
semantic interpretation of the sentence —even if ‘John’ and ‘Mary’, as lexical primitives, do.  
 
Some representations, Fodor argues, do not have a canonical decomposition at all. It 
is not just that some of their parts are constituents and some aren’t. It’s just that some 
representations do not have any constituents thus understood. They are iconic. Pictures are 
paradigms of representations that do not admit a canonical decomposition and hence do not 
have constituents. Pictures are paradigms of iconic representation. Pictures do have structure 
and they thus have parts, but each part contributes in the same way to the interpretation of the 
picture. If talking about compositionality makes any sense here, it is only in the following 
diluted sense captured by Fodor’s Picture Principle: “If P is a picture of X, then parts of P are 
pictures of parts of X” (Fodor, 2007, p. 108).  
 
As iconic representations, pictures have all kind of properties that discursive 
representations lack. Although they are semantically evaluable, they do not have logical form 
—as the logical form of a representation is determined by its constituents and pictures do not 
have constituents. There isn’t e.g. anything like the negation of a picture or the disjunction of 
two pictures. Since they do not have logical form, Fodor argues, there are no principles of 
 
 
individuation that could be applied to what they depict. They do represent, but they do not 
represent as: “a picture may show three giraffes in the veldt, but it likewise shows: a family 
of giraffes; and an odd number of Granny’s favorite creatures; and a number of Granny’s 
favorite odd creatures; and a piece of veldt that is inhabited by any or all of these” (Fodor, 
2007, p. 110). Since to represent as is characteristic of conceptualized representations, iconic 
representations, which do not represent as have, Fodor assumes, a different kind of content: 
one worth calling ‘non-conceptual content.’ 
 
There are, to be sure, several different questions here. I’ll use three of them to guide 
the discussion in the rest of the paper. The first, empirical, question is whether or not there 
are any mental representations that are iconic in the sense just explained. It’s one of the 
merits of Fodor’s paper (2007, pp. 112-113) to convince us that the literature in the 
psychology of perception is full of cases that seem to suggest that there are indeed mental 
representations that exhibit the properties captured by his idea of iconicity. In particular, 
some of the earliest processes through which visual information goes seem to operate on 
representations that do not individuate the items they represent. Fodor reminds us of 
Sperling’s experiments (1960), in which subjects are exposed to a 3 x 4 grid of alphanumeric 
characters for 50 milliseconds. After a blank delay of up to 500 msec., subjects insist that the 
can visualize all or almost all the characters they have seen, but are usually able to report 
only up to four of them. Nonetheless, Sperling showed that when prompted by differently 
pitched tones for each row, played immediately after the 4 x 3 display has been turned off, 
subjects are able to retrieve all or almost all the alphanumeric characters in any given row, 
i.e., subjects are able to report the top row of the grid if prompted by the high pitched tone, 
the bottom row if prompted by the low pitched tone and the middle if the medium pitched 
tone was produced.vii These results suggest that the subjects do have conscious access to all 
the visual information, but that such information, as it becomes conceptualized, is then 
subject to limitations imposed by (probably) short-term memory. 
 
It’s not just Fodor who relies on experimental psychology to provide evidence for the 
existence of iconic mental representations. Cognitive maps —the kind of mental 
representations we make of our environment in order to find our way around— become the 
 
 
central case in Heck’s defense of the iconicity of certain mental representations (2007, pp. 
125-128). Cognitive maps are presented as a clear instance of action-oriented mental 
representations of spatial information that do not have a canonical decomposition. 
Topographic features in cognitive maps are often defined relative to each other, and relative 
to the map, in an iconic fashion, so there is no canonical way of decomposing the maps’ 
interpretable parts. One of the consequences of representing spatial information in this way, 
one very much in harmony with Fodor’s idea of iconic representations lacking any kind of 
logical form, is that the information in cognitive maps is not closed under Boolean operations 
—again, there isn’t anything like the negation of my cognitive map of central Edinburgh. 
 
Cognitive maps can and do enter into processes of rationalization. That seems 
difficult to deny. We form beliefs about where things are based on the cognitive maps we 
have of our environments and behave in ways that can be accounted for by our relying on 
having represented spatial information in that particular way. However, cognitive maps, 
Heck argues, fail to meet the following two empirical conditions characteristic of states with 
conceptual content. First, the states must be structured in such a way as to support the 
generalizations made explicit by GC. Second, and importantly, the assumption that 
conceptual states are thus structured ought to provide the basis for an explanation of the 
GC’s satisfaction itself (Heck, 2007, p. 123). Heck argues that cognitive maps either do not 
support the sorts of generalizations required by GC or the fact that such generalizations hold 
cannot be explained in terms of the cognitive maps’ structural features. He then contends that 
perceptual experiences are like cognitive maps in that respect. The content of perceptual 
experiences is —he concludes— of a different kind, i.e., nonconceptual.  
 
If Fodor and Heck are both right, not only are there iconic mental representations —
so we have an affirmative answer to our first, empirical, question— but the representations 
involved in perceptual experiences fall under such a category. This being the case, the 
second most relevant question clearly is whether the iconicity of perceptual representations 
could be brought to bear on the issue of the nonconceptual nature of their content. I examine 
this issue at length in the next two sections. Also in Section 4 and in Section 5, I address the 
third and final question of whether the notion of nonconceptual content that comes out of this 
 
 
strategy is a notion that applies to the content of the subject’s experience and hence whether 
it can appear in true explanations of the subject’s intentional behavior. I call this ‘the sub-




3. Representations and their content. 
 
The question of whether the iconic structure of perceptual representations 
determines the (nonconceptual) nature of their content is a particular case of a more 
general issue, namely, whether the properties of mental states tell us anything about the 
kind of content they have. As I said in the Introduction, the issue is particularly pressing, 
as the fact that certain states are structured (or structured in a particular way) need not 
show that their contents are too, and vice-versa.  The dialectical move from state-
structure to content-nature may thus appear to be a version of the vehicle / content 
confusion: the confusion of thinking that the representational properties of a certain type 
of states reflect their causally relevant structural properties. In fact, the recent distinction 
between ‘state’ and ‘content’ interpretations of perceptual nonconceptualism can be 
viewed as a reminder of the dangers of ignoring the vehicle / content distinction. But 
before I bring the discussion under that rubric (in next section), there is a question that I’d 
like to address here first. 
 
 It is fairly standard, at least in the context of discussions about the content of 
perception, to find conceptual content characterized as content that is structured so as to 
satisfy the generalizations supported by GC or, more frequently, content that is subject to 
GC. The move from state-structure to content-nature thus seems to be granted in the case 
of thought —and not just for those involved in the traditional perceptual 
(non)conceptualism debate, i.e., for the neo-Fregeans. As mentioned earlier, Concept 
Atomists also take the compositional structure captured by GC to determine the 
conceptual nature of thought content. So, if there are indeed good reasons to grant this 
dialectical move in the case of conceptual content, the claim that nonconceptual content 
 
 
is content so (canonically un)structured so as to fail to satisfy the generalizations 
supported by GC shouldn’t be regarded as prima facie theoretically suspicious. So, are 
there good independently motivated reasons warranting the neo-Fregeans’ and Concept 
Atomists’ move from considerations about state-structure to considerations about 
content-nature in the case of conceptual content?  
 
I think there are. Despite holding unmistakably opposite views on concepts and 
despite being motivated by totally different considerations (more about this shortly), what 
explains why neo-Fregeans and Concept Atomists join forces to defend the relevance of GC 
for characterizing the notion of conceptual content is that both seek a cognitively relevant 
notion of mental content, i.e., a notion of content that links content individuation and content 
attribution to true psychological explanations of intentional behavior. And one plausible way 
of making content psychologically sensitive is to appeal to the causally explanatory structural 
features of the mental representations with such content —the kind of structural features that 
GC arguably makes explicit. Both neo-Fregeans and Atomists, as opposed to e.g. those who 
hold a pleonastic view of concepts (Byrne, 2005) or those who characterized content in terms 
of a function of possible worlds to truth values (e.g. Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968) thus 
consider it a desideratum of any theory of content to give an account of how the content of 
mental representations explains intentional behavior —with GC providing (either necessarily 
or contingently) just such an explanatory connectionviii. This (modally different) appeal to the 
structure that GC makes explicit allows both groups to deal with cases which have a different 
cognitive significance and hence, at least intuitively, a different content, yet the same 
reference —so-called Frege cases. It’s just that, of course, whereas neo-Fregeans like Heck 
take the constituents of such structure to be individuated semantically and thus take Fregean 
senses as the constituents of thought, Concept Atomists like Fodor take the structure’s 
constituents to be individuated syntactically: they are thus viewed as concrete mental 
representations —actual items syntactically tokened within the subject’s cognitive 
architecture.  
 
There are thus good, independently motivated reasons, for granting both neo-
Fregeans and Concept Atomists their dialectical move from state-structure to content-nature 
 
 
in the case of conceptual content. I turn now to the issue of whether the difference between a 
syntactic and a semantic approach to GC might nevertheless have a significant consequence 
with regard to the plausibility of the same strategy in the case of nonconceptual content.  
 
 
4. State and content nonconceptualism. 
 
I suggested earlier that the plausibility of the state-structure to content-nature strategy 
in the case of nonconceptual content should go hand in hand with the plausibility of the same 
strategy with regard to conceptual content. I have now argued that there seem to be good 
reasons to think that the strategy works in the case of conceptual content. In the 
nonconceptual case, however, we face extra pressure in light of the recent distinction 
between ‘state’ and ‘content’ interpretations of perceptual nonconceptualism. Those who 
champion this distinction (e.g. Crowther, 2004; Speaks, 2005) argue that claims about 
concept possession and claims about compositionality are in fact logically independent, as 
shown by the prima facie coherence of the two following hybrid positions. On the one hand, 
it seems consistent to hold that, at least on a certain understanding of concept possession, 
perceptual experiences and beliefs have different kinds of content, but that, in both cases, the 
subject having the belief or undergoing the experience must have the concepts involved in a 
correct characterization of such content (let’s call this thesis ‘SNC1’). On the other hand, it 
also seems coherent to hold that the content of perceptual experiences and the content of 
beliefs are of the same kind, but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the 
subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of its content —
while by contrast possession of the relevant concepts is indeed required in the case of belief 
(let’s called this second hybrid position ‘SCN2’). 
 
The argument for SNC1 can be summarized as follows: even if perceptual 
experiences and beliefs may be said to have different kinds of content in virtue of their 
different compositional structure, at least on a certain understanding of concept possession, it 
is the conceptual repertoire of the subject undergoing a perceptual experience that determines 
which contents are available to her as contents of her experience. Hence the content of 
 
 
perceptual experiences would be nonconceptual in a rather uninteresting, sub-personal, way 
(Crowther, 2004). It is here that what I call ‘the sub-personal worry’ appears for the first 
time. The worry, introduced as the third question for discussion at the end of Section 2, is 
that the (nonconceptual) content that non canonically decomposable perceptual 
representations have may not be content of the right kind, i.e., that it may not be the kind of 
content that captures the subject’s own point of view. 
 
Now, Fodor’s position seems to fit SNC1’s profile rather well. So, I’d like to show, 
first of all, that his nonconceptualism does succumb to the sub-personal worry. We have to 
remember that, for Fodor, concepts are individuated, not in terms of any of their epistemic 
properties, but in virtue of their being nomically locked onto properties in the subject’s 
environment (1988). Concepts are mental representations and possessing a concept consists, 
on his view, in having a mental representation of what the concept is a concept of. Perceptual 
representations, by contrast, carry information about objects and properties in the world, but 
such representations, unlike conceptualized representations, do not individuate the objects 
and properties they represent, i.e., they do not represent anything as being a particular object 
or a particular property and hence have a different kind of (nonconceptual) content. 
Perceptual representations carry information in virtue of facts about reliable empirical 
connections between e.g. the subject’s visual system and her environment, but it’s only when 
such informational content enters into processes of thinking, and hence into processes that 
involve conceptualized representations, that it becomes the content of the subject’s 
perceptual experience and hence it is the subject’s conceptual repertoire that ultimately 
determines which contents become the contents of her experience. That seems to be precisely 
Fodor’s interpretation of what’s going on with the subjects in Sperling’s experiment, when 
they can report only three of the letters they had been exposed to, but any three of them: 
“[s]o it appears there is a very short-term visual memory of which the capacity is, at a 
minimum, considerably greater than what S is able to read out of it. Apparently it is the cost 
of conceptualizing information in this memory, rather than the number of items that the 
memory is able to register, that bounds the subject’s performance” (Fodor, 2007, p. 113, my 
emphasis). The fact that SNC1 seems to reflect Fodor’s view on nonconceptual content so 
well may be considered a reason for the traditional neo-Fregean (non)conceptualist’s to 
 
 
neglect it. Also, not surprisingly, a traditional conceptualist like McDowell would object 
that, on a view like SNC1, i.e., on Fodor’s view “conceptual capacities… do not enter into 
determining the content with which one takes oneself to be presented, but serve only to 
account for one’s access to that content, which is independently determined by the 
informational system” (McDowell, 1994, p. 64).  
 
Let me move now to the second hybrid position, SNC2. The alleged logical 
independence of claims about representations and their content that SNC2 illustrates may be 
defendedix when considering representations’ relational properties, i.e., when it’s the 
property of being related to a concept-possessing subject that it’s taken to be decisive for 
determining the representations’ kind of content. However such logical independence would 
become incoherent when, as in Heck’s argument, the properties called upon are 
representations’ intrinsic properties. This is why. 
 
Heck’s suggestion is, as we saw, that perceptual representations are like cognitive 
maps. Now, an essential feature of cognitive maps is that the spatial primitives, i.e., the 
landmarks, are always represented as a set of movements. But, this being the case, when we 
credit a subject with a spatial representation about an object a at location F, this doesn’t 
commit us to the idea that the subject can represent a independently of F. Hence it doesn’t 
commit us to the idea that the subject should also be able to represent a at location G or 
another object b at location F. In other words, spatial representations do not seem to be 
subject to GC. If, as Heck claims, the representations involved in perceptual experiences are 
—like cognitive maps— essentially iconic and hence do not have a canonically 
decomposable structure, then we seem to have a strong argument in favor of taking the 
content of such representations to be of a genuinely different kind. Here, the iconicity of the 
representations makes it inconsistent to hold that the content of such representations is 
conceptual while the relationship between the subject undergoing a perceptual experience 
and the content of the representation involved in such an experience is nonconceptual. For 
this hybrid position to be consistent, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a 
canonical characterization of the content of their perceptual representations. But the main 
 
 
feature of cognitive maps is precisely that there is no canonical characterization to begin 
with.  
 
Furthermore, as a neo-Fregean, Heck (unlike Fodor) contends that an account of 
concepts is an account of concept possession. Possessing a concept is not to have a particular 
mental representation. Possessing a concept is an ability or set of complex abilities that the 
subject deploys whenever entertaining thoughts containing that concept.x Concepts are 
understood as ability-types, and, hence as the objective, non-psychological, abstract, entities 
that the Fregean gloss requires. At the same time, there is nothing more to the nature of those 
ability-types than their instantiation in the form of the set of abilities a subject exercises 
when she entertains thoughts containing that concept. On a characterization of concepts 
along this neo-Fregean line, SNC2 would thus become incoherent, as it would entail that a 
subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. On Heck’s neo-Fregean 
understanding of concepts, to claim that the content of the representations involved in 
perceptual experiences is of a different (nonconceptual) kind just is to claim that the subject 
doesn’t posses the concepts involved in a psychologically relevant characterization of such 
content, and, as I argued, the neo-Fregean understanding of concepts is, in turn, 
independently and plausibly motivated by the need to accommodate the cognitive 
significance of content. Heck’s neo-Fregean account of concepts thus makes his position 
immune to the state / content confusion that SNC2 allegedly exemplifies and it indeed 
illustrates how the alleged error becomes a state / content error error. 
 
 
5. Icons and reasons. 
 
Could the sub-personal worry discussed in last section with regard to Fodor’s 
nonconceptualism apply to Heck’s (2007) argument for perceptual nonconceptualism? In 
addressing this question, I turn back again to the third question outlined at the end of Section 
2: is the different kind of content that perceptual representations have in virtue of their iconic 
structure the content of the subject’s perceptual experience? The sub-personal worry may 
strike back for Heck’s version of perceptual nonconceptualism because the idea that a subject 
 
 
could undergo genuine personal-level perceptual experiences even while her conceptual 
abilities are switched off sits badly with the broadly Kantian considerations that move, not 
the advocates of the state / content distinction, but the traditional perceptual conceptualist. 
And it is not just traditional perceptual conceptualists who may disturb the waters here, some 
friends of perceptual nonconceptualism (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003) also argue that at least 
one kind of nonconceptual content in visual perception —what they call visuomotor 
content— does not enter into the subject’s conscious visual awareness and hence is not part 
of the subject’s visual experience.  
 
It is precisely in relation to certain instances of (at least pre-theoretically) non-
conscious representations that this worry usually arises, as some well known experimental 
results seem to show a dissociation between the content of visual experiences and the 
information that guides the subject’s fine-grained sensorimotor action based on those 
experiences —a putative example involves the Titchener circles illusion (Byrne, 2001; 
Poston, 2007). On one version of this illusion, two circles of the same size are perceived as 
being different when one is surrounded by an annulus of smaller and the other by an annulus 
of larger circles. The circle surrounded by smaller circles appears (incorrectly) to be bigger 
than the other. However, when the illusion is implemented using 3D pieces, and subjects are 
asked to pick up one of the central circles, their grip accurately corresponds to the actual size 
of the center disc, instead of being scaled to the illusory size that the disc is experienced as 
having (Aglioti et al., 1995).  
 
So, here is this version of the sub-personal worry. Cases like the Titchener illusion 
show that the information that guides the subject’s visually guided motor action does not 
capture how the world appears to the subject. Otherwise, the finger-thumb aperture would 
have been scaled to the illusory size the circle is perceived as having. Since it is essential that 
perceptual representations be located at the personal-level, i.e., that they be part of the 
subject’s experience, so that they can enter into true explanations of intentional behavior and 
since at least some action-oriented representations (like the ones involved in the grasping of 
Titchener circles) do not seem to be part of the subject’s experience, their content cannot be 
 
 
considered content of a relevantly different (nonconceptual) kind, i.e., it cannot be 
considered personal-level nonconceptual content (see e.g. Poston, 2007). 
 
Now, the 3D version of the Titchener circle illusion is usually considered in the 
empirical literature as supporting Milner and Goodale’s (1995, 2006) ‘dual visual systems 
hypothesis’ (see also Goodale et. al., 1991). According to this view, the mechanisms and 
coding of information in conscious visual experience are different from, and quite 
independent of, the mechanisms and coding of information used to guide fine-grained online 
visuomotor action. The dorsal pathway connects the primary visual cortex (V1) to the 
posterior parietal cortex —the brain area for motor control— and it provides information for 
the guidance of skilled visuomotor action. The ventral stream runs from V1 to the infero-
temporal cortex —the conceptual and language processing area of the brain. It is considered 
responsible for the subject’s recognitional and classificatory abilities concerning visually 
guided action. The ventral stream —Milner and Goodale claim— subserves conscious 
perceptual judgment. In the Titchener illusion, the dissociation between illusory conscious 
visual content and the fine-grained information that guides motor actions is thus usually 
explained by reference to this dual stream model. 
 
However, the empirical literature does not unequivocally support this interpretation. 
It has been suggested, for instance, that there may be rather more interaction between the two 
streams that the initial experiments seemed to suggest and that the level of such interaction is 
task-dependent (see e.g. Ellis et al., 1999). The philosophical discussion of the empirical 
literature regarding this type of illusion has been considerable (see e.g., Clark, 2001 and 
Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003), so I will mention it only briefly here. My main concern, to be 
clear, is whether or not the dissociation between conscious visual content and fine-grained 
motor-guided behavior observed in some cases of illusory visual perception provides a good 
reason for supporting the claim that the notion of nonconceptual content that comes out of a 
version of perceptual nonconceptualism like Heck’s (2007) cannot be considered the 
required (personal-level) content of the subject’s perceptual experiences. I don’t think it 
does. To explain why, consider Clark’s (2001) analysis of these results. Clark’s suggestion 
for connecting intentional action to conscious visual experience is to make the relationship 
 
 
indirect, mediated by the use of other cognitive resources —especially attention— which put 
sensory systems in contact with higher-level faculties, such as working and episodic 
memory. If this picture is right, then perception is really geared towards recalling and 
reasoning and only indirectly towards action. When we say that the content of perceptual 
experiences (illusory or not) guides our behavior, ‘we must unpack that notion of guidance as 
the high-level, intentional selection of action types and targets—we must depict it as the 
capacity to consciously use the perceptual array to identify goals, plan actions, and select 
skilled routines …, but not to control the fine detail of those sensorimotor routines 
themselves’ (Clark, 2001: 516).  
 
That the grasping of the middle circle is adjusted to their real size, not to their 
perceived size, would thus imply, according to this view, that the content of the visual 
representation doesn’t control the fine detail of the subject's action. Instead it guides action in 
a rather mediated way, by selecting the target circle and by choosing a type of action 
(grasping) to apply to it —both these choices being mediated by the use of higher-level 
cognitive faculties. In visual perception, the notion of nonconceptual content thus remains 
relevant for true explanations of intentional behavior once we replace an experience-based 
control for an experience-based selection model.xi 
 
Interestingly, the hypothesis of experience-based selection (EBS), as Clark labels 
it, may seem to fit best with conceptualist accounts of the content of perceptual 
experience, as Clark himself acknowledges (Clark, 2001, pp. 513-514). However, it’s 
Clark’s “radical” counter-suggestion for reconciling EBS with the notion of 
nonconceptual content that I draw on here. The counter-suggestion is radical because it 
involves the construction of a notion of perceptual content that includes both the 
traditional, passive, filling out of visual space and the way such experience affords fluent 
engaged action (Clark, 2001, pp. 514-515. See also Clark, 2009).  
 
It might be suggested, in response, that by thus making the potential deployment of 
sensorimotor skills —or the ‘implicit knowledge of potentials for fine-tuned action’, as 
Clark (2001, p. 515) calls it— into an element of the nonconceptual content of perceptual 
 
 
experience, we drive an unacceptable wedge between experience and a subject’s reasons 
for actionxii. This is not the case. We need instead to distinguish two ways in which a 
state can provide a subject with reasons. One way is to provide for some kind of verbal 
justification of a response. The other, arguably more fundamental way, is to reveal the 
response to the subject as appropriately grounded in her own experiencexiii. It is in this 
latter sense that the contents of nonconceptual states may be said to provide reasons for 
actions. Clark piggybacks here on Dretske’s (2006) view that conscious experience can 
occur alongside a belief that one is aware of nothing, i.e., that we sometimes do not 
notice the things we are consciously aware of. It would thus not be difficult for him to 
extend this view to the 3D case scenario and claim that the subjects are consciously 
aware of both the illusory and the right size of the circles. It is just that they do not notice 
the latter. They are consciously aware of it at the sensorimotor level and it is their 
experience at this level that provides them with a reason, albeit a non-verbal one, for their 
action. Clark’s radical counter-suggestion thus escapes the sub-personal worry by 
depicting implicit knowledge of potentials for fine-tuned action as also determining, in 
part, the way things look to the subjectxiv. 
 
More important for my purposes, however, is the already mentioned consideration 
that when we seek to explain intentional behavior, the explanandum is not the complex set of 
fine adjustments involved in the implementation of such behavior. What we want to explain 
is gross intentional behavior. It’s precisely gross intentional behavior that is at issue in the 
discussion of the kind of content possessed by the representations involved in cognitive 
maps. We are, for example, not concerned with the fine details of foot placing or head 
turning. Although fine-grained sensorimotor action is the focus of the 3D version of the 
Titchener circle illusion, most situations where mental representations have an explanatory 
role to play are situations in which such fine detail is not the target of the explanation. The 
content of the representations that guide gross intentional behavior seems to belong naturally 
to the personal-level domain, since the faculties exercised in the guidance of the behavior are 







In this paper I have argued that, given a psychologically sensitive notion of content, 
structural properties of mental states provide good criteria for determining the kind of 
content those states possess. I have examined this issue in the light of two deceptively similar 
recent arguments (Fodor, 2007 and Heck, 2007), aiming to show that the iconic structure of 
perceptual representations establishes their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) 
kind. I have argued that when such cognitive significance is captured in the syntactic terms 
that Fodor’s understanding of GC demands, the resulting nonconceptualist position is open to 
a version of what I have called the sub-personal worry, i.e., the worry that it is actually the 
subject’s conceptual repertoire that makes this kind of nonconceptual content available for 
the subject in experience. Fodor’s nonconceptualism thus is a weaker version of the view, for 
although non-conceptual content can be regarded as content of a different kind, it is not, on 
this account, content of the right kind. Heck’s neo-Fregean understanding of GC, by contrast, 
not only makes the state-structure to content-nature strategy successful. It helps illustrate 
how, on a neo-Fregean approach, the state / content error becomes a state / content error 
error. Heck’s neo-Fregean nonconceptualism undermines the state / content dichotomy by 
relying on a view of concepts and concept possession so essentially tied to cognitive abilities 
that the logical independence of the theses that characterize the state and the content view of 
nonconceptualism becomes unsustainable. Finally, I have discussed whether the sub-personal 
worry still affects Heck’s position, as cases of illusory visual experiences like the Titchener 
illusion seem to show a dissociation between the content of the experience and the 
information that guides the subject’s fine-grained sensorimotor action. I have argued that any 
such worry disappears once perceptual content is construed on the more explanatorily 
relevant model of experience-based selection. 
 
I’d like to end with a brief word about the differences between Fodor’s and Heck’s 
versions of nonconceptualism. It may seem, from the arguments put forward in this 
paper, that the neo-Fregean account is preferable, as it doesn’t succumb to the sub-
personal worry. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that this approach has difficulties of 
its own. The main problem for the neo-Fregean nonconceptualist is to provide a 
 
 
convincing account of perceptual justification given the distinctive commitment to an 
internalist epistemology that motivates the view, i.e., the commitment to a notion of 
perceptual justification constrained by the idea that the justification of perceptual beliefs 
supervenes on facts that the subject is able to know by reflection alone.xv McDowell 
(1994) has famously characterized the nonconceptualist model of perceptual justification 
as a view that falls pray to Sellars’ (infamous) Myth of the Given (Sellars, 1963). On the 
nonconceptualist account, what is epistemically available to a subject as a justifier would 
seem to be, if McDowell were right, just mythically Given to her, i.e., it would be 
available to the subject without her exercising the appropriate conceptual cognitive 
capacitiesxvi. Fodor’s epistemic externalism —where perceptual justification is cashed out 
in terms of facts about reliable empirical connections between a subject’s responsive 
dispositions and the content-bearing constituents of her experience— gives priority, by 
contrast, not to a normative epistemology, but to empirical psychology and thus may 
seem to have a more straightforward and, arguably, more plausible answer to this 
question. On Fodor’s view, unconceptualized representations can be considered, pace 
McDowell, the datum that grounds perceptual beliefs and judgments, and hence the 
process of conceptualization can be viewed as consisting in subsuming content of one 
(nonconceptual) kind under content of a different (conceptual) kind. But epistemic 
externalism also faces a number or serious problems, of which the subject’s perspective 
objection is probably the most relevant in the present contextxvii. It may thus very well be 
that an appropriate treatment of the sub-personal worry becomes crucial in evaluating 
these two competing epistemological approaches. Clearly, the relevance of the worry 
goes well beyond the specific issues discussed in this paper. It lies in the way in which it 





I would like to thank Richard Heck and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. Research for this paper was partially funded by the MICINN, Spanish 
government under the research project FFI2008-06164-C02-02, the CONSOLIDER 
 
 
INGENIO 2010 Program, grant CSD2009-0056, and by the Catalan government via the 
consolidated research group GRECC, SGR2009-1528. 
 
 
                                               
i In what follows, unless otherwise noted, I shall be referring to the (non)conceptualism 
debate as it appears within this tradition.  
ii This is not an exhaustive list. See also Martin (1992) and Heck (2000). 
iii Technically speaking perceptual experiences, unlike e.g. beliefs, are not mental states, 
but conscious mental events or episodes. However, like e.g. beliefs, those mental events 
have semantically evaluable contents. In the aim of clarity, I’ll tend to talk about the 
content of perceptual states or the content of perceptual representations and would thus 
ignore this distinction. Nothing in my argument depends on this treatment.  
iv Also called ‘the absolute’ and ‘the relative’ nonconceptualist thesis (Speaks, 2005). 
v Susan Hurley in her (2008) paper speaks of a ‘causal-constitutive error error’. This is a 
small tribute to her. 
vi The slogan is an accurate slogan on a neo-Fregean view of concepts. I’ll return to this 
in Section 4.  
vii See also Block (2007). 
viii On a possible worlds account of content, such as e.g. Stalnaker’s (1998), all content 
becomes non-conceptual, but in a rather uninteresting way. 
ix But see Toribio (2008). 
x Cf. e.g. Peacocke’s Principle of Dependence: “There can be nothing more to the nature 
of a concept than is determined by a correct account of the capacity of a thinker who has 
mastered the concept to have propositional attitudes to contents containing that concept (a 
correct account of ‘grasping the concept’” (Peacocke, 1992, p. 5) 
xi Jacob and Jeannerod follow Clark and characterize, not their notion of visuomotor 
content, but the conscious nonconceptual content of visual perception as content that “is 
not geared towards the guidance and control of action. Rather, it is geared towards the 
‘selection’ of objects that can be either goals for visually guided actions or food for 
thought” (2003, p. 16). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
xii This certainly seems to be one of the referees’ worry. 
xiii This second way in which a state can provide a subject with reasons is closely related 
to what Dretske (2006) calls a ‘justifying reason’. 
xiv Thanks to Andy Clark for clarifying this point in a personal communication. 
xv Where reflection includes introspective awareness of the subject’s own mental states, a 
priori knowledge, and memory of all knowledge thus acquire. Pryor (2001, p. 104) labels 
this view ‘simple internalism’. 
xvi There are, however, compelling arguments (see e.g., Heck, 2000; Peacocke, 2001) 
against this allegation, arguments that show that perceptual nonconceptualism is indeed 
consistent with epistemic internalism.  
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